Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine and the risk of new Kremlin provocations across Europe have radically changed the way EU countries approach national security and defense.
One of the consequences of this change was a new focus on Russian citizens’ ownership of real estate near strategic locations.
Several EU states have revealed cases where Russians have bought land next to military bases, power plants or border zones, often to build “holiday villages” that could serve non-civilian purposes. Officials warn that the assets could be used for espionage, sabotage or as logistical support points in the event of potential ground incursions.
In response, some EU countries have taken measures to enact preventive measures to limit or filter the acquisition of real estate by nationals of aggressor states. Among the most proactive examples are frontline countries Finland and Latvia, which adopted different but complementary legal frameworks in the summer of 2025.
Finland: Protection of critical infrastructure
Since joining NATO, Finland has treated hybrid threats from Russia as a key challenge to national security. Russian citizens have long been free to buy real estate across the country, but the Defense Ministry has identified more than 3,500 properties linked to Russian owners in the past five years — some with questionable features like large helipads or fortified buildings near key infrastructure.
Others involved investments in abandoned hotels or warehouses near border crossings. These patterns have raised concerns about potential non-commercial motives behind such acquisitions.
To address the risk, Finland amended its real estate laws in July 2025 to introduce a “hard filtering” system for foreign ownership. Under the new rules, citizens and entities from countries that threaten national security or violate the territorial integrity of another nation automatically face obstacles in obtaining property rights.
Finland’s Ministry of Defense now monitors all property purchase requests involving foreign nationals, with access to intelligence from migration, police and tax authorities. Exceptions exist for persons with permanent residence in Finland or valid EU long-term residence permits issued by the Finnish authorities, ensuring legal security for those already integrated into Finnish society.
Latvia: Extension of restrictions to companies
The Latvian approach, although different in scope, serves the same purpose. Until recently, Riga’s oversight of real estate transactions near defense or infrastructure facilities was weak, and the government did not have accurate data on how much real estate was owned by Russians or Belarusians.
By the beginning of 2025, the authorities have identified over 1,800 Russian and 120 Belarusian citizens as the real owners of companies that own real estate in Latvia, reports SEEbiz. The government responded with a series of legislative changes that culminated in the Law on Restrictions on Transactions Threatening National Security, adopted in the summer of 2025.
The law prohibits the acquisition of property with capital associated with aggressor states and restricts the use of such property in ways that could undermine Latvia’s interests. The ban extends not only to individuals, but also to legal entities registered in those countries or controlled by their citizens.
The restriction applies if at least 25% of the company’s capital or voting rights belong to Russian or Belarusian citizens or if they are the ultimate beneficial owners. There are narrow exemptions for EU permanent residents and cases of inheritance, with transitional provisions for ongoing transactions.
The Latvian model directly links real estate regulation to economic security, recognizing that concentrated ownership by hostile actors can serve as a tool of indirect pressure.
Ukraine still lags behind
Ukraine, in contrast, still lacks a clear legal framework to prevent the ownership of real estate by citizens or entities from aggressor states. Prior to 2014, Russians were active buyers in Crimea, Odessa and Kiev, often buying beachfront homes or investment apartments. Even after the annexation of Crimea, such transactions continued until 2022.
Although administrative restrictions and sanctions have since curtailed these businesses, a comprehensive legal ban remains lacking. Experts claim that Ukraine should follow the example of Finland and Latvia by introducing an explicit legal ban on the acquisition of real estate by citizens and companies of aggressor states, as well as those under their control.
The obligation to adopt such a law was established three years ago, but it has not yet been fulfilled. Although it was included in the legislative plan of the Verkhovna Rada and the Cabinet of Ministers for 2025, it was quietly dropped during the last update.
